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Introduction
How many choices for broadband internet does the typical American
consumer have? A recent report issued by the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) surveying advanced telecommunications capability1
across the country found that only 38 percent of Americans have more than
one choice of providers for fixed advanced telecommunications capability.2
“The competitive options for advanced telecommunications capability are
even more limited for Americans living in rural areas, with only 13 percent
having more than one choice of providers of these services.”3 The significant
market power of internet service providers (“ISPs”) in the internet

1. The term “advanced telecommunications capability” is defined by Congress as “highspeed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and
receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology.”
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, §706, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
2. See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in A Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible
Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, As Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 31 FCC Rcd. 699, 702 ¶ 6 (2016)
[hereinafter 2016 Broadband Progress Report].
3. Id.
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marketplace gives ISPs the ability and incentive to adopt anticompetitive
practices favoring the content of their affiliate content providers.4
In 2015, the FCC adopted a regulatory framework “protecting and
promoting the open internet,” the 2015 Open Internet Order (“2015 Order”),5
commonly known as “net neutrality” rules.6 These rules prevented ISPs from
exercising their gatekeeper power in ways that excluded or prioritized edge
provider content, harming competition. The FCC provided detailed studies
demonstrating ISPs significant gatekeeper power and the need to curb this
power to support its implementation of bright-line conduct rules. These rules
prohibited broadband providers from engaging in three types of conduct that
the FCC found harmful to an open internet: blocking, throttling, and paid
prioritization.7 The FCC addressed the inability of antitrust alone to curb
exclusionary conduct by ISPs,8 finding that “case-by-case enforcement [was]
cumbersome for individual consumers or edge providers, and that there is no
practical means to measure the extent to which edge innovation and
investment would be chilled”9 without conduct rules. Instead, antitrust
enforcers would work in concert with the new bright-line conduct rules to
ensure competition in the marketplace.10 To allay concerns voiced by ISPs
during the comment period, the final 2015 Order adopted a “light touch”
approach, making over 700 codified rules applicable to Title II common
carriers inapplicable to ISPs.11 This was a “carefully tailored application of
only those Title II provisions found to directly further the public interest in
an open internet.”12
In 2017, Commissioner Ajit Pai, a vehement dissenter of the 2015 Order,
was designated Chairman of the FCC. Soon after, the FCC issued a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking suggesting the repeal of the clear, bright-line
conduct rules of the 2015 Order and replacing them with the case-by-case
enforcement the FCC had declared impractical only three years earlier.13
The Restoring Internet Freedom Order of 2018 (“2018 Order”) in effect
today relies solely on antitrust enforcement and mandatory disclosures by

4. See infra Part I.D.1.
5. In the Matter of Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 Order].
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5607–8 ¶¶ 14–18.
8. See infra Part I.D.1.
9. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5608 ¶ 19.
10. Id. at 5693 ¶ 203.
11. Id. at 5612 ¶ 37.
12. Id.
13. See Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25568 (proposed June 2, 2017).
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ISPs of their exclusionary conduct, to prevent the harms to competition
posed by ISPs’ gatekeeper power. It does so without presenting hard
evidence to rebut the FCC’s previous findings that antitrust enforcement
alone is insufficient, and that conduct rules are necessary to protect the open
internet market.14
This note posits that the 2015 Order’s “light touch framework” correctly
found that bright-line conduct rules are necessary to regulate ISPs’
gatekeeper power and prevent them from engaging in exclusionary conduct.
It further argues that the FCC correctly determined that case-by-case antitrust
enforcement alone is not a practical solution for preventing ISPs from
abusing their power. This note proceeds in the following manner: Part I
explains the history of the concept of net neutrality and the events leading up
to the 2015 Order. It then details the regulations of the 2015 Order and the
FCC’s support for these regulations. Part II examines the 2018 Order’s
changes as well as the justifications, or lack thereof, provided to support
these changes. Part III explores the principal argument that antitrust
enforcement is unable to substitute the clear, bright-line conduct rules of the
2015 Order. It does so by first examining the conduct at issue, vertical
agreements and “single firm” exclusionary conduct, and addressing the
historical lack of legal development and enforcement in this area. It then
gives a brief overview of the ideological underpinnings of the Chicago
School literature, often credited with influencing the inattention to vertical
conduct in antitrust. The note proceeds by examining the difficulties inherent
in both private and public enforcement, and why such actions will not
provide remedies for the harms caused by anticompetitive behavior in the
internet marketplace. The note then uses vertical mergers, one sub-type of
the vertical agreements at issue, to demonstrate the permissive view antitrust
discourse generally takes toward vertical arrangements. It examines two
vertical merger cases from the past decade. The AT&T-Time Warner merger
case exemplifies this permissive view of vertical mergers between an ISP
and a content provider even after regulatory protections of the 2015 Order
were repealed. Then, the Comcast-NBCU merger demonstrates the
ineffectiveness of the conduct remedies put in place when a court finds a
vertical merger problematic. Finally, this note concludes that antitrust is an
insufficient substitute for the conduct rules of the 2015 Order.

14. See generally 2015 Order, supra note 5.
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I. Net Neutrality
Without strong competition, [broadband] providers can (and do)
raise prices, delay investments, and provide sub-par quality of
service. When faced with limited or nonexistent alternatives,
consumers lack negotiating power and are forced to rely on
whatever options are available. In these situations, the role of
good public policy can and should be to foster competition and
increase consumer choice.”15
— Former President Barack Obama January 14, 2015
The FCC first attempted to address ISPs’ anticompetitive conduct in
2010.16 The 2010 Open Internet Order (“2010 Order”) prevented ISPs from
intentionally blocking or throttling any content by imposing “disclosure,
anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination requirements on broadband
providers.”17
A. What is Net Neutrality?
The term “network neutrality” gained popularity in a 2003 law review
article by Tim Wu,18 examining whether an internet service provider should
be required to treat all data and content it delivers equally.19 Wu’s article
suggests that a regulatory regime treating all content equally will serve to
“prevent a distortion in the market for internet applications”20 without
“imping[ing] the ability of broadband carriers to earn a return from their
infrastructure investments.”21 Today, net neutrality is commonly defined as

15. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Community Broadband Solutions: The Benefits of
Competition and Choice for Community Development and Highspeed Internet Access, p. 3–4 (Jan.
14, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/community-based_broad
band_report_by_executive_office_of_the_president.pdf.
16. See generally In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices,
25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order].
17. KEVIN E. MCCARTHY, OLR BACKGROUNDER: APPELLATE COURT DECISION ON NET
NEUTRALITY 3 (2014), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt /pdf/2014-R-0033.pdf. See 2010 Open
Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17906, 17936–50.
18. See TIM WU, A PROPOSAL FOR NETWORK NEUTRALITY 1 (June 2002), http://www.
timwu.org/OriginalNNProposal.pdf.
19. Id. at 2–3.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 9.
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prohibiting prioritization of internet traffic, with or without compensation.22
“Edge providers,” also known as content providers, provide content for the
internet, 23 including applications, video content, websites, and services an
end user of the internet seeks to access.24 The major commercial content
providers include, for example, Amazon, Facebook, Google, Netflix, and
Skype. ISPs are broadband providers that handle traffic flow from edge
providers ultimately delivering the content to the end-user, the consumer.25
Examples of these include AT&T, Comcast, and Verizon.
The net neutrality debate has two prevailing sides. Opponents of net
neutrality regulations take the position that allowing for different data
treatment and charging structures for certain content providers allows them
to invest in faster service and better technological developments.26 On the
other hand, proponents of net neutrality rules argue that such regulation of
ISPs is necessary insurance for the maintenance of consumer choice, and
prevents ISPs from becoming the gatekeepers of end-user content.27
B. The Development and Importance of Net Neutrality Rules
1. Title I and Title II Classifications
The legal framework for the 2015 Order has its roots in the
Communications Act of 1934, which combined and organized federal
regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications, as well as
created the FCC to oversee and regulate these industries.28 The Act
differentiates between “general information services” and “common
carriers,” the term “common carrier” referring to “any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio.”29 Under Title II, the Commission has the authority to ensure that
common carriers do not engage in unjust and unreasonable practices or
preferences.30 In 1968, the FCC applied Title II regulation to telephone

22. Shane Greenstein, et al., Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understanding the Tradeoffs, 30
J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 128 (2016).
23. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17907 note 2 (defining an edge provider as
providers of content, applications, services, and devices).
24. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5607.
25. Id.
26. Greenstein, et al., supra note 22, at 128.
27. Id.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 153.
30. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5894.
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companies, requiring that they allow customers to use equipment of their
choice on the network.31 As a common carrier service, telephone companies
were required to provide services to businesses of all kinds, even ones they
saw as potential competitors.32 This authority was used as a legal basis for
the bright-line conduct rules in the 2015 Order.
2. History
The issue of how to classify broadband internet under the
Communications Act first arose in the courts in 2000.33 The Ninth Circuit
held that “cable modem service is a telecommunications service to the extent
that the cable operator provides its subscribers internet transmission over its
cable broadband facility, and an information service to the extent the
operator acts as a conventional ISP.”34 This meant that cable broadband
internet providers would be subject to regulations of a Title II-classified
service, meaning that they could not throttle or prioritize content. Then, in
2002, the FCC classified broadband internet providers as Title I service
providers, subjecting them to minimal regulation.35
In 2010, Comcast throttled down the speed of Netflix video, and
demanded that Netflix either enter into a paid peering arrangement with
Comcast or upgrade its transit network, prompting the FCC to issue the 2010
Order.36 The order regulated ISPs by prohibiting blocking, throttling, and
“‘unreasonable discrimination’ against lawful network traffic.”37 The goal of
these rules was to “preserve the internet as an open platform for innovation,
investment, economic growth, [and] competition.”38 The FCC recognized
this openness created a “virtuous cycle of innovation”39 in which “new uses

31. See In the Matter of Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.
2d 420, 423–24 (1968).
32. Reply Comments of Public Knowledge, Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket 17-108
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1083005674359/PK_Net_Neutrality_Reply_Com
ments_2017.pdf.
33. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000).
34. Nia Chung Srodoski, A Balancing Act: the Virtue of a “Light Touch” Regulatory
Framework in the 2015 Open Internet Order, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 517, 536 (2016) (citing
City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871).
35. See Press Release, FCC Classifies Cable Modem Service as “Information Service,” FCC
(Mar. 14, 2002), http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/2002/nrcb0201.html.
36. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17905, 17926. See also Srodoski, supra note
34, at 518.
37. Id. at 17906 ¶ 1.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 17910 ¶ 14.

Gray Erased_[Final-for-Tom] Rubin_The Heavy Burden of a Lighter Touch
Framework.docx (Do Not Delete)4/8/2019 1:53 PM

236

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:2

of the network—including new content, applications, services, and devices
—lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, which drives network
improvements, which in turn lead to further innovative network uses.”40
These rules were a regulatory response to a change in the internet ecosystem
from the first decade of the public internet, “when dial-up was the primary
form of consumer internet access.”41 In contrast to the days of dial-up,
broadband providers “have the incentives to interfere with the operation of
third-party internet-based services” that compete with the providers’ own
services.42
Much of the 2010 Order was struck down in 2012 by the D.C. Circuit
in Verizon v. F.C.C.43 The court determined that because broadband
providers were classified as an “information service” by the FCC in its 2002
rulemaking, broadband service providers could not be regulated as a
“telecommunications service” or “common carrier” under Title II.44 The
court did not rule that the Commission was unable to enforce such rules,
however. The Verizon Court acknowledged the FCC’s power to define how
these services should be classified.45 But, in order to enforce the regulations
it proposed, the FCC needed to reclassify ISPs as a Title II common carrier,
because these regulations were inconsistent with the light regulatory
authority of a Title I service.46 While the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Verizon left
ISPs free from the 2010 Order’s conduct rules,47 such freedom was only
temporary. A few years later, the FCC would ultimately succeed in enacting
these rules.
C. The Internet Service Provider Market
1. Structure of the Market
It is important to note the features of the ISP market, as it currently
stands, to provide better context for the necessity of net neutrality rules.
Similar to telephone line expansion, cable companies began to build
infrastructure across the U.S. by approaching local governments for
permission to build and invest in infrastructure, in exchange for exclusive

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 17910–11 ¶ 14.
Id. at 17916 ¶ 22.
Id.
See Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 623–624.
Id. at 628.
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rights to provide cable services in the area.48 Increasing prices in cable
services and minimal competition led to the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act, which marked the end of this pattern of
setting up exclusive regional franchises.49 However, by this time, the cable
companies already built the sole cable infrastructure in their regional area.
During the first decade of the public internet, “dial-up was the primary
form of consumer internet access.”50 Independent companies such as
America Online and Prodigy provided access to the internet51 over
companies’ phone lines.52 Eventually, broadband became the internet service
of choice because of higher speeds, fast enough to stream video.53 As
broadband replaced dial-up, telephone and cable companies, rather than
independent companies, emerged as the main providers of internet access
service.54
2. Proposed Pro-Competitive Solutions
Some argue that more independent companies should build competing
infrastructure, and that greater broadband deployment across the United
States is hindered because of local governments imposing regulatory costs,
sometimes referred to as “pre-deployment barriers.”55 However, city

48. See Mat Honan, Why the Government Won’t Protect you from Getting Screwed by Your
Cable Company, GIZMODO (Aug. 15, 2011), https://gizmodo.com/5830956/why-the-governmentwont-protect-you-from-getting-screwed-by-your-cable-company.
49. See EV EHRLICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNET REGULATION (2014),
https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014.03-Ehrlich_A-Brief-Hist
ory-of-Internet-Regulation.pdf.
50. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17916.
51. Id.
52. Independent internet provider companies were able to use telephone company’s lines to
provide dial-up internet service because telephone companies were required to lease their lines to
competitors under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which instated “mandatory unbundling of
telephone services and rigid price controls.” Telephone service and dial-up internet can be
contrasted with the later broadband internet service, classified as an “information service” under
the Telecommunications Act, and was not subject to mandatory unbundling requirements. See
EHRLICH, supra note 49.
53. See Christopher Jon Sprigman, Net Neutrality is Great, but it Won’t Make Broadband
Cheaper, THE NEW YORKER (June 21, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/netneutrality-is-great-but-it-wont-make-broadband-cheaper (discussing the unrealistic nature of
building competing internet networks).
54. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17916.
55. See Berin Szoka, Jon Henke & Matthew Starr, Don’t Blame Big Cable. It’s Local
Governments that Choke Broadband Competition, WIRED (July 16, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://
www.wired.com/2013/07/we-need-to-stop-focusing-on-just-cable-companies-and-blame-localgovernment-for-dismal-broadband-competition/.
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planning, safety, environmental, and engineering costs may justify these
regulatory costs.
Replicating a cable company’s local network is, for the most part,
uneconomic, though some have tried. Verizon attempted to launch its own
fiber network (“FiOS”) but eventually had to abandon the project.56 The cost
of tearing up streets to lay fiber optic cable, or stringing cable on utility poles,
was prohibitively expensive, except in the densest urban areas.57 Even
Google, the technological behemoth, was unable to build out substantial
competing networks.58
The duplication of efforts in broadband infrastructure is not
economically feasible for any competitive upstart. The reality is that the
internet marketplace needs either conduct rules that control anticompetitive
conduct by ISPs, or it needs local loop unbundling.59 “Local loop
unbundling” refers to regulations requiring cable companies to lease access
to their hardware, the copper and fiber-optic cables, switches, and local
offices that connect the internet to homes and buildings.60 Such unbundling
was implemented in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, requiring
telephone companies to lease access to their phone lines to competitors at
below-market prices.61
When the D.C. appellate court upheld the FCC’s decision to reclassify
broadband access as a telecommunications service, the FCC had the ability
to pursue a mandate on local loop unbundling;62 however, it instead chose
net neutrality rules as its regulatory option. As discussed in the next section,
the decision to forgo local loop unbundling was a policy choice made by the
2015 FCC.63 Therefore, for purposes of this paper, the 2015 Order’s net
neutrality rules will be viewed as the primary alternative to the FCC’s current
internet regulatory framework under the 2018 Order.

56. Sprigman, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Sprigman, supra note 53 (referring to local loop unbundling as: “an awkward term of
art that essentially means forcing cable companies to lease access, for a price and on terms set by
the F.C.C., to the copper and fiber-optic cables, switches, and local offices that connect the main
arteries of the Internet to individual homes and buildings”).
61. See EHRLICH, supra note 49. These unbundling provisions contained a sunset provision
in the early 2000s.
62. Id.
63. See infra Part I.D.1.
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D. The Open Internet Order of 2015
1. A ”Light Touch” Framework
In enacting the 2015 Order, the FCC recognized that ISPs are
gatekeepers. ISPs have “significant bargaining power in negotiations with
edge providers [that] depend on access to their networks because of their
ability to control the flow of traffic into and on their networks.”64 This
significant bargaining power puts ISPs in the position of gatekeeper,
meaning that “regardless of the competition in the local market for
broadband internet access, once a consumer chooses a broadband provider,
that provider has a monopoly on access to the subscriber.”65 As gatekeepers,
“[ISPs] can block access altogether; target competitors, including
competitors to their own video services; and they can extract unfair tolls.”66
Additionally, ISPs have “powerful incentives to accept fees from edge
providers, either in return for excluding their competitors, or for granting
them prioritized access to end users.”67 The FCC noted that while “the ability
of [ISPs] to exploit this gatekeeper role could be mitigated if consumers
could easily switch broadband providers,”68 the evidence in the record
suggested that consumers could not easily switch broadband providers.69 A
switch in providers was impossible in large part because “45 percent of
households have only a single provider option for 25 Mbps/3 Mbps
broadband service.”70 This indicates that “45 percent of households do not
have any choices to switch to at this critical level of service.”71 To keep this
gatekeeper power in check, the FCC adopted bright-line bans on blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization, the three specific practices that the
Commission found “invariably harm[ed] the open internet.”72 The
prohibition on blocking prevented an ISP from “block[ing] [consumer access

64. 2015 Order, supra note 5 at 5629 ¶ 80.
65. Id.
66. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5609 ¶ 20.
67. Id. at 5608 ¶ 19.
68. Id. at 5680–1 ¶ 80.
69. Id.
70. To qualify as broadband service, the FCC’s broadband benchmark speeds are 25 megabits
per second (Mbps) for downloads and 3 Mbps for uploads. See 2015 Broadband Progress Report,
FCC (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/broadband-progress-reports/
2015-broadband-progress-report.
71. Id. at 5681 ¶ 81.
72. Id. at 5607 ¶ 14.
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to] lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices”73
“Throttling” refers to the “degradation of lawful content, applications,
services, and devices.”74 The FCC found the ban on throttling “necessary [to]
avoid gamesmanship designed to avoid the no-blocking rule by, for example,
rendering an application effectively, but not technically, unusable.”75 “‘Paid
prioritization’ refers to the management of a broadband provider’s network
to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic . . . in exchange
for consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third party, or to benefit an
affiliated entity.”76 In addition to the bright-line conduct rules, the FCC
adopted a catch-all standard generally prohibiting ISPs from engaging in any
unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantage to consumers or
edge providers.77
The FCC found that “case-by-case enforcement can be cumbersome for
individual consumers or edge providers,”78 choosing instead to adopt brightline conduct rules to regulate ISP behavior. The conduct rules would be a
“regulatory backstop . . . prohibiting common carriers from engaging in
unjust and unreasonable practices” and the FCC’s regulatory and
enforcement oversight would be “complementary to vigorous antitrust
enforcement.”79
The FCC recognized the concern that “a swath of utility-style
provisions” may harm ISPs’ profitability and therefore decrease investment
in infrastructure.80 Thus, the FCC chose to apply Title II in a focused way,
making inapplicable to ISPs over 700 codified rules otherwise applicable to
Title II common carriers, including: “no [local loop] unbundling, no
tariffing, [and] no rate regulation.” It referred to this focused application of
Title II as a “light-touch” approach, “apply[ing] only those Title II provisions
found to directly further the public interest in an open internet.”81

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. at 5607–8 ¶ 18.
Id. at 5609 ¶¶ 21-2.
Id. at 5608 ¶ 19.
Id. at 5963 ¶ 203.
Id. at 5612 ¶ 38.
Id. ¶ 37.
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II. The Restoring Internet Freedom Order
The era of a mandatory open internet ended with the final Restoring
Internet Freedom Declaratory Ruling (“2018 Order”),82 released January 4,
2018. The 2018 Order again reclassified broadband internet services as an
“information service” under Title I of the Communications Act. It
additionally eliminated the conduct standards and the rules prohibiting
blocking and throttling.83 Finally, the 2018 Order shifted the regulatory
oversight of ISP practices from the FCC to the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”). The sections that follow explore each of these changes.
A. The “Lighter Touch” Framework
1. Title II to Title I
By reclassifying ISPs as an “general information service” under Title I
of the Communications Act, the agency gave itself only light regulatory
power over the actions and pricing of ISPs,84 such as the ability to impose
disclosure requirements. In turn, the FCC deprived itself of the regulatory
authority to impose bright-line conduct rules for ISPs in the future. The
justification for this change was to “increase investment and encourage
deployment of internet services to underserved areas and encourage
upgrading of facilities in already served areas.”85 According to the FCC, the
Title II regime “chilled investment” and prevented such deployment because
it caused regulatory uncertainty.86 The FCC additionally cited the concern of
“regulatory creep,” stating that regulators did not know how the 2015 Order
would be interpreted.87
The FCC supported its conclusion by relying on two studies looking at
the change in ISP investments since enactment of the 2015 Order. Both
studies concluded that aggregate ISP investment had decreased since the

82. See generally In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018)
[hereinafter 2018 Order].
83. Id.
84. Nia Chung Srodoski, A Balancing Act: the Virtue of a “Light Touch” Regulatory
Framework in the 2015 Open Internet Order, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 517, 543 (2016).
85. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 492 ¶ 308.
86. Id. at 368 ¶ 99 (stating that uncertainty of what is allowed and what is not allowed under
the Title II regime has caused ISPs to “shelve projects that were in development, pursue fewer
innovative business models . . . or delay rolling out new features or services”).
87. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 369–70 ¶ 101 (citing statement of former FCC Chairman
Tom Wheeler).
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adoption of the 2015 Order, one finding that aggregate investment in 2016
decreased a total of three percent from 2014 levels. However, the rulemaking
also accurately acknowledged that declines in capital investment can change
depending upon the industry and the business cycle.88 Such comparative
studies, the FCC noted, are “only suggestive”89 since they do not account
for other factors such as evolving technology and the fact that “large
investments often occur in discrete chunks rather than being spaced out
evenly over time.”90 Additionally, the 2015 Order had specifically tailored
the common carrier obligations of Title II to lessen potential burdens to
ISPs,91 shielding them from aspects of Title II that ISPs claimed would hurt
investment such as rate regulation and unbundling requirements,92 and
replacing burdensome regulating with three, bright-line conduct rules that
ISPs themselves stated would not discourage them from investment.93
Nevertheless, the FCC concluded that Title II regulation has led to a
downward trend in investment,94 and thus was too burdensome on ISPs,
supporting a change back to Title I.
2. Reliance on FTC Consumer Protection Laws and
Antitrust
a. Shifting Regulatory Oversight to the FTC
Another major change the FCC made in the 2018 Order was the shifting
of regulatory oversight of broadband ISPs’ conduct to the FTC. The FTC
enforces federal consumer protection laws that prevent fraud, deception and

88. See S. DEREK TURNER, IT’S WORKING: HOW THE INTERNET ACCESS AND ONLINE VIDEO
MARKETS ARE THRIVING IN A TITLE II ERA 88–9 (May 2017), https://www.freepress.net/
sites/default/files/2018-06/internet-access-and-online-video-markets-are-thriving-in-title-IIera.pdf.
89. 2018 Order, supra note 82, ¶ 92.
90. Id.
91. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5603 ¶ 5.
92. Id. at 5818, 5849-50 ¶¶ 458, 513.
93. Id. at 5795-6 ¶ 416. (“Tellingly, major infrastructure providers have indicated that they
will in fact continue to invest under the framework we adopt, despite suggesting otherwise in their
filed comments in this proceeding. For example, Sprint asserts in a letter in this proceeding that . . .
‘Sprint does not believe that a light touch application of Title II, including appropriate forbearance,
would harm the continued investment in, and deployment of, mobile broadband services.’
Verizon’s chief financial officer, Francis Shammo, told investors in a conference call in response
to a question about the effect of ‘this move to Title II,’ that ‘I mean to be real clear, I mean this
does not influence the way we invest.’”) (internal citation omitted).
94. 2018 Order, supra note 82, ¶ 92.
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unfair business practices.95 The FTC also enforces federal antitrust laws that
prohibit anticompetitive mergers and other business practices that could lead
to higher prices, fewer choices, or less innovation.
The FTC has the authority to protect consumers from “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices” under Section 5 of the FTC Act.96 An unfair or
deceptive act or practice is one that creates substantial consumer harm, is not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers, and that consumers
could not reasonably have avoided.97 Private citizens and businesses cannot
enforce the FTC Act because there is no private right of action; however,
consumers and other businesses may file a complaint with the FTC about a
business’s conduct, triggering an investigation. Then, once the FTC finds
there to be a violation of the law, it may enter into a consent order with the
company or begin an administrative proceeding.98
b. The Transparency Rule
The 2018 Order adopted a revised transparency rule, requiring “[a]ny
person providing broadband Internet access service [to] publicly disclose
accurate information regarding the network management practices,
performance, and commercial terms of its broadband internet access
services.”99 The revised transparency rule is as follows:
Any person providing broadband Internet access service shall
publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its
broadband Internet access services sufficient to enable consumers to
make informed choices regarding the purchase and use of such
services and entrepreneurs and other small businesses to develop,
market, and maintain Internet offerings. Such disclosure shall be
made via a publicly available, easily accessible website or through
transmittal to the Commission. 100

95. The Enforcers, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitru
st-laws/enforcers (last visited Mar. 5, 2019).
96. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 606 ¶ 141 (stating that “The FTC has broad authority to
protect consumers from ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’” and that “[a]s the nation’s premier
consumer protection agency, the FTC [can] exercise its authority, which arises from Section 5 of
the FTC Act, to protect consumers in all sectors of the economy”).
97. Id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
98. The Enforcers, supra note 95.
99. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 645 ¶ 215.
100. Id. at 440 ¶ 220.
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All ISPs are specifically required to disclose blocking, throttling,
affiliated prioritization,101 congestion management,102 application-specific
behavior,103 and device attachment rules.104
The FCC claimed that the new transparency rule would help achieve their
goal of identifying and addressing potential market entry barriers.105 The
next section explains why this is an unrealistic prospect.
c. Change in Authority in the 2018 Order
An additional change the FCC made in the 2018 Order is the shifting of
regulatory oversight of broadband ISPs’ conduct to the FTC. The FCC
deemed the regulation of ISPs under 2015 Order “unnecessary to address
conduct that harms internet openness,” and instead chose to rely on “antitrust
law and the FTC’s authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prohibit unfair
and deceptive practices.”106
The 2018 Order relied on the voluntary commitment of the largest ISPs,
such as AT&T and Comcast, not to block or throttle legal content.107 The
FCC stated that the FTC’s Section 5 authority makes such voluntary
commitments by ISPs enforceable because it “prohibits companies from
selling consumers one product or service but providing them [with]
something different.”108 In the event that an ISP acts in a manner inconsistent
with its disclosures, such an act could arguably be seen as an unfair act or

101. “Affiliated Prioritization” is defined as: “Any practice that directly or indirectly favors
some traffic over other traffic, including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping,
prioritization, or resource reservation, to benefit an affiliate, including identification of the
affiliate.” Id.
102. “Congestion Management” is defined as pertaining to: “Descriptions of congestion
management practices, if any. These descriptions should include the types of traffic subject to the
practices; the purposes served by the practices; the practices’ effects on end users’ experience;
criteria used in practices, such as indicators of congestion that trigger a practice, including any
usage limits triggering the practice, and the typical frequency of congestion; usage limits and the
consequences of exceeding them; and references to engineering standards, where appropriate.” Id.
103. “Application-Specific Behavior” is defined as: “Whether and why the ISP blocks or ratecontrols specific protocols or protocol ports, modifies protocol fields in ways not prescribed by the
protocol standard, or otherwise inhibits or favors certain applications or classes of applications.”
Id.
104. “Device Attachment Rules” are defined by as: “Any restrictions on the types of devices
and any approval procedures for devices to connect to the network.” Id.
105. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 653 ¶ 233.
106. Id. at 393–4 ¶ 140.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 394–5 ¶ 141 (citing Acting Chairman Ohlhausen Comments at 10-11).
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practice. 109 The FCC asserted that the FTC can “enforce these promises” not
to block or throttle by bringing an enforcement action using its authority to
prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices under Section 5 of the FTC
Act.110 This case-by-case ex post regulation, the FCC contended, is “better
suited for regulating a dynamic industry like the internet.”111 Additionally, it
reasoned, should ISPs decide not to make these voluntary promises,
consumers and edge providers will resist any attempt by ISPs to undermine
the openness of the internet.112
The FCC’s arguments for changing this regulatory authority are flawed
for several reasons. For one thing, the FCC gives the impression that the FTC
will aggressively go after ISPs who break their voluntary promises. Even if
the FTC does aggressively monitor ISPs, simply enforcing promises in an
industry lacking competition is ineffective, because the ISPs can stop making
voluntary promises without being faced with market pressures such as the
“resistance” of consumers and edge providers.113 As mentioned above, most
consumers are limited to one broadband provider,114 so once ISPs stop
making these promises, consumers and edge providers will be powerless to
resist, and without remedy. There will no longer be a promise for the FTC to
enforce, and ISPs will be free to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
3. Reliance on Antitrust Laws to Prevent Blocking,
Throttling, and Paid Prioritization
The FCC additionally justified repealing the 2015 Order by relying
on the ability of both the FTC and private citizens to bring antitrust actions
challenging any anticompetitive conduct in the internet sector.115 The FTC
enforces three laws with respect to antitrust law: the Sherman Act, the FTC
Act, and the Clayton Act. These are the three core federal antitrust laws in
effect today. The Sherman Act outlaws “every contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade,” and any “monopolization, attempted
monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize.” The standard
for assessing business conduct under the Sherman Act is a two-pronged
approach: (1) per se illegality if the conduct is considered “so harmful to

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 395–6 ¶ 142.
Id. at 396 ¶ 142 n.512.
Id.
Id. at 396 ¶ 142.
Id.
See supra Part I.C.1.
Id.
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competition that they are almost always illegal;” and (2) rule of reason
analysis if the conduct does not fall into an established anticompetitive
category articulated under law.116
The 2018 Order relies on the threat of liability under Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act to prevent ISPs from making agreements amongst
themselves to block, throttle, or discriminate against internet content.117
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits exclusionary conduct by a firm with
the dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.118 Section 2
additionally prohibits vertically integrated ISPs from anticompetitively
favoring their content or services over other unaffiliated edge providers’
content or services. The 2018 Order posits that many of the net neutrality
violations cited in the 2015 Order could have been investigated as antitrust
violations.119 The 2018 Order does not, however, address whether such
antitrust violations would actually be challenged by a federal agency or a
private individual, or the likelihood of success in litigation. The FCC stated
the possibility of finding antitrust liability, without addressing the concerns
the 2015 Order originally raised regarding feasibility of regulation through
case-by-case enforcement. Part III of this paper examines the weaknesses of
case-by-case antitrust enforcement, on which the FCC principally relies.

B. Standard of Review for Challenging Administrative Agency
Rulemakings
When an administrative agency makes a change to its regulations and
such a change is challenged, a reviewing court must only set aside agency
action when it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”120 Indeed, since the 2018 Order took
effect, lawsuits have been filed alleging that the FCC’s regulatory changes
were arbitrary and capricious.121 Whether the 2018 Order might be set aside

116. Jennifer E. Gladieux, Towards a Single Standard for Antitrust: The Federal Trade
Commission’s Evolving Rule of Reason, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 473 (1997).
117. 2018 Order, supra note 82, at 395 ¶144.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
119. Id.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
121. For a recent challenge to the 2018 Order, see Brief for Petitioner, Mozilla Corp. v. FCC,
No. 18-1051 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2018). Various petitioners including activist groups and state
governments challenged the 2018 Order, alleging it violated the Communications Act and is
otherwise arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. They also
argued the 2018 Order did not fully assess issues such as market concentration and how the antitrust
and consumer protection laws would function in the absence of regulation by the Commission. The
D.C. Circuit invoked the Supreme Court’s holding in Nat’l Cable & Tele. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
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under this standard of judicial review is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet,
one important point also raised in recent litigation is whether the FCC has
fully assessed and supported how the consumer protection laws and antitrust
alone would function in the absence of regulation by the FCC.122 The next
part of this paper addresses this concern, looking specifically at the
weaknesses of reliance on antitrust.

III.

Antitrust Enforcement is Not the Answer to the
Anticompetitive Harms the Net Neutrality Rules
Sought to Fix

A. Anticompetitive Vertical Conduct is the Main Focus of Net
Neutrality Rules
As mentioned in Part II, ISPs’ strong economic bargaining power puts
them in a gatekeeper position, and the ability of ISPs to exploit this
gatekeeper role cannot be mitigated by the ability of consumers to switch
broadband providers.123 This power “distinguishes [ISPs] from other
participants in the internet marketplace who have no similar control [over]
access to the internet for their subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach
those subscribers.”124 Ultimately, ISPs have a strong incentive to engage in
exclusionary conduct, whether such conduct is through “accepting fees from
edge providers. . .in return for excluding their competitors or for granting
them prioritized access to end users”125 or through blocking or throttling the
content of rival content providers that competes with an affiliate of the ISP.
Vertical conduct refers to dealings between two companies operating in
the same sector, but along different points in the supply chain.126 The three
types of exclusionary conduct that the 2015 Order prohibited, blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization, all qualify as vertical conduct because they
each concern ISPs exercising control over edge providers. ISPs and edge

Services, which affirms the FCCs authority to classify broadband internet services as information
services. See Paul Werner & Imad Matini, D.C. Circuit Hears Challenge to Federal
Communications Commission’s 2018 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, FCC LAW BLOG (Feb. 4,
2019), https://www.fcclawblog.com/2019/02/articles/fcc/challenge-to-fcc-2018-order/.
122. See Paul Werner & Imad Matini, supra note 121.
123. See supra Part I.D.1.
124. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5630 ¶ 80.
125. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5608 ¶ 19.
126. Versus Trump: Trump the Trustbuster (Interview with Lina Khan), TAKE CARE BLOG
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/versus-trump-trump-the-trustbuster-interview-wit
h-lina-khan.
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providers are both participants in the internet marketplace, but while one
provides the broadband service connection, the other provides the content,
applications, and services an end user of the internet seeks to access,127
therefore putting them at different points in the supply chain.
While vertical conduct between ISPs and edge providers is not, by itself,
anticompetitive, the FCC in its 2015 Order recognized that, due to the ISPs’
substantial market power, “the threat of harm is overwhelming.”128 A
recognized term for this situation in antitrust law is “single firm conduct”, or
conduct that often involves exclusion by a dominant firm.129 Such “single
firm conduct” occurs when a company has such a strong position in the
marketplace that their behavior may no longer be subject to competitive
pressures.130 The vertical nature of the exclusionary conduct at issue presents
unique challenges in terms of antitrust enforcement, which are discussed in
the following sections.

B. Anticompetitive Harm from Vertical Conduct is Viewed
with Skepticism
1. Possible Harms Resulting from Exclusionary Vertical
Conduct
ISPs can engage in several different forms of exclusionary conduct that
results in harming competition in the internet market. These include
imposing constraints on rival conduct,131 and engaging in vertical
agreements to sell an exclusionary right to rivals.132 An ISP can directly
constrain rivals by imposing costs or reducing rivals’ access to customers.133
Constraints can be more obvious, such as when an ISP blocks or degrades
access to unaffiliated online video to their broadband subscribers.134
Constraints can also be slightly more subtle, but equally harmful. Take, for

127. See generally 2015 Order, supra note 5.
128. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5608 ¶ 19.
129. Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527,
529 (2012); see also Single Firm Conduct, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct (last visited Mar. 31, 2019) (describing single
firm conduct as actions of a single firm with market power “to the point where their behavior may
not be subject to common competitive pressures”).
130. See Single Firm Conduct, supra note 129.
131. Baker, supra note 129, at 537.
132. Id. at 539.
133. Id. at 537.
134. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5632 ¶ 81.
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example, “zero rating,” which is the process of choosing not to count a
specific content provider’s packets against a customer’s data cap.135 As noted
in the 2015 Order, data caps or allowances “can negatively influence
customer behavior and the development of new applications.”136 In fact, we
have already seen ISPs engage in this behavior prior to enactment of the 2015
Order.137
Additionally, ISPs can engage in vertical agreements to sell an
exclusionary right to certain edge providers, “either in return for excluding
their competitors or for granting them prioritized access to end users.”138
This creates “fast lanes” for those edge providers able to afford it, and “slow
lanes” for others.139 “By interfering with the transmission of third parties’
internet-based services or raising the cost of online delivery for particular
edge providers, [ISPs] can make those services less attractive to subscribers
in comparison to [rival] offerings.”140
Unfortunately, due to the historical and ideological context of the
antitrust laws, the cost, difficulty, and unpredictability in litigation, and the
ineffectiveness of common behavioral remedies, antitrust law is unable to
rectify the harms resulting from the anticompetitive exclusionary conduct of
ISPs, as explored in detail below.
2. Historically, Vertical Conduct Issues Have Been a
Low Priority for Antitrust Enforcement
Modern antitrust discourse has focused mainly on horizontal conduct,
neglecting the area in which exclusion primarily arises, vertical
agreements.141 Since 1980, substantially more cases involving horizontal
restraints have been brought in the U.S. than cases where exclusion is likely
involved, such as monopolization and vertical agreements.142 It is rare that

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. In 2014, AT&T created a policy under which edge providers could pay to be exempt from
data caps on streaming. See Jon Brodkin, AT&T Turns Data Caps into Profits with New Fees for
Content Providers, ASRTECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:24 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/
2014/01/att-turns-data-caps-into-profits-with-new-fees-for-content-providers/ (“Basically, the
price of data is being charged to content providers instead of consumers.”).
138. 2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5609 ¶ 21.
139. Id.
140. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 16, at 17918.
141. Baker, supra note 129, at 527.
142. Id. at 576.
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agency challenges to vertical mergers reach completion.143 Moreover, the
long outdated 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines emphasize the harms of
reduced market entry prospects and the facilitation of collusion, while
neglecting the impacts of “foreclosure” and receiving little attention from the
courts.144 The antitrust enforcement agencies have “emphasiz[ed] collusion
over exclusion in articulating enforcement priorities.”145 Indeed, according
to a former FTC chairman, it is “uncontroversial . . . that non-merger
antitrust enforcement should focus on horizontal activities”146
Vertical arrangements were not always neglected in antitrust discourse.
In fact, for many years, antitrust agencies took a prophylactic approach to
both horizontal and vertical arrangements, relying on bright-line rules and
structural presumptions in their enforcement standards through the 1970s.147
However, a group of scholars, often referred to as the “Chicago School,”148
emerged as critics of this prophylactic approach, and their ideologies gained
popularity in the lower courts, ultimately influencing the antitrust
enforcement we have today.149
This influential scholarship signaled a large change in antitrust
enforcement; a shift in the approach to vertical arrangements was one
component.150 Chicago School scholars attacked vertical merger
enforcement as economically irrational.151 These scholars’ influence created
a shift in thinking from what once was a general skepticism of vertical
arrangements, to a presumption that vertical arrangements should generally
be legal and viewed as efficient and pro-competitive.152
In arguing that foreclosure is illusory, Chicago School scholars
essentially assert that the vertical integration of, or agreements between,

143. See Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger
Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 91 WASH.
L. REV. 199, 201 n.5 (2016).
144. Id. at 201 n.6 (citing 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 FR 26823-03).
145. Baker, supra note 129, at 528.
146. Id.
147. Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 YALE
L.J. 960, 966–7 (June 4, 2018).
148. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. F. 710, 719 n.29 (2017). “‘The
Chicago School’ refers to the group of legal scholars and economists, primarily based at the
University of Chicago, who developed neoclassical law and economics in the mid-twentieth
century.” Id.
149. Khan, supra note 147, at 965–6.
150. TAKE CARE BLOG, supra note 126.
151. Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1963
(May 2018).
152. Id.
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firms from different points in the supply chain do not present the risk of
excluding rivals from inputs and customers. In other words, because these
companies are not competing directly in the same sector, there is not actually
a reduction in competition.153 However, we know that this is not the case in
the internet market, because ISPs hold gatekeeper power, enabling them to
avoid additional competitive pressure on their affiliated services by
interfering with the transmission of third parties’ internet-based services.
Indeed, “the concepts of anticompetitive foreclosure and leverage are not
empty and illogical, and exclusionary strategies can profit firms and harm
competition.”154 Nonetheless, this prevailing ideology permeates through
antitrust enforcement, and has led to overall inattention to vertical restraints.

C. Private Antitrust Litigation Does Not Offer Adequate
Remedies for Edge Providers
The 2018 Order finds that “most of the net neutrality violations discussed
in the 2015 Order could have been investigated as antitrust violations,”155
focusing on whether the ISP was engaging in anticompetitive foreclosure to
preserve monopoly power. Acting Federal Trade Commission Chairman
Maureen Olhausen, an opponent of net neutrality rules, argued that antitrust
can accommodate net neutrality concerns, stating that “antitrust would forbid
efforts by ISPs with significant market power to foreclose rival content.”156
How accurate is this promise?
The FTC can bring cases under the FTC Act against the same kinds of
activities that violate the Sherman Act.157 An FTC investigation into a
business’s conduct may be triggered by correspondence from consumers or
other businesses. Then, once the FTC finds there to be a violation of the law,
it may enter into a consent order with the company. If a company signs a
consent order, it must agree to stop the disputed practices outlined in an
accompanying complaint.158 Such consent orders, as well as consent decrees,

153.
154.
155.
156.

TAKE CARE BLOG, supra note 126.
Baker, supra note 129, at 532.
2018 Order, supra note 82, at 364 ¶ 88.
HAL J. SINGER, PAID PRIORITIZATION AND ZERO RATING: WHY ANTITRUST CANNOT
REACH THE PART OF NET NEUTRALITY EVERYONE IS CONCERNED ABOUT 7 (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug17_singer_8_2f.aut
hcheckdam.pdf, (citing Maureen K. Olhausen, Antitrust Over Net Neutrality: Why We Should Take
Competition in Broadband Seriously, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 119, 136 (2012)).
157. Vertical restraints are typically covered by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
158. The Enforcers, supra note 95.
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are discussed below.159 Private parties, both individuals and businesses, can
also bring suits enforcing the antitrust laws and seeking damages for
violations of the Sherman or Clayton Acts.160 In fact, private antitrust
enforcement vastly exceeds public enforcement, with roughly ten private
federal cases brought for every one case brought by either the Department of
Justice or the FTC.161 Given the lack of attention agencies give to vertical
restraints, this portion of the paper looks specifically at private antitrust
litigation.
Vertical restraints are generally judged under the rule of reason.162 The
rule of reason balances efficiencies and anticompetitive effects, requiring a
plaintiff to show harm to competition.163 An important question, then, is
whether there would be a cognizable antitrust violation for the vertical
restraints contemplated by the 2015 Order under the rule of reason.
Economist Hal. J. Singer answers this question in the negative.164 In his
article critiquing the ability of antitrust to reach net neutrality concerns,
Singer poses a hypothetical case in which an ISP offers preferential treatment
for an online content supplier’s packets for a fee. The arrangement is
discriminatory; however, there is no exclusion of other content suppliers, as
they still have access to the ISP’s customers, just with less favorable
treatment.165 Additionally, by offering preference to a single content provider
while still carrying the packets of other providers, the ISP has at most
diverted eyeballs from rival content providers’ sites.166 Such a mild
preference likely would not raise a content rival’s cost. Without price or
output effects, a complainant would have difficulty demonstrating
anticompetitive effects.167
The harm identified in Singer’s hypothetical is potential loss of
innovation.168 The 2015 Order referred to this as disruption to the “virtuous
cycle of innovation.”169 Rival content providers in a paid prioritization
scenario would be discouraged from investing in R&D and developing
superior content if they believed the playing field was slanted toward a rival

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See infra Part III.C.
The Enforcers, supra note 95.
Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1179 (2008).
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
SINGER, supra note 156, at 1, 5.
Id. at 9.
SINGER, supra note 156, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
2015 Order, supra note 5, at 5627 ¶ 77.
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content provider.170 Harm to innovation, however, though recognized by
antitrust law as an anticompetitive injury, is difficult to prove.171 From an
antitrust perspective, harm to the consumer is the primary concern,172 and
without immediate price or output effects, the harm inflicted on the rival
content providers likely would not be considered an antitrust violation. Then,
even if harm to consumers is proven, the harm must be balanced against
possible efficiencies in a rule of reason analysis. Even Olhausen
acknowledged that there may be no antitrust violation if an “edge provider
partners with an ISP that agrees to prioritize its content over lesser
alternatives,”173 the very conduct the net neutrality rules were aimed to
prevent.
Antitrust agencies do not typically bring harm-to-innovation cases,
instead focusing resources on restrictions limiting or excluding firms from
working with horizontal rivals.174 This leaves the private litigant to bring a
case on a difficult to prove antitrust harm. In addition to the difficulty in
bringing the case, there are practical impediments to prevailing in court.
Antitrust cases move slowly. The Georgetown study of private antitrust
litigation conducted in the early 1980s found that antitrust cases take, on
average, about three times longer than other federal cases from initiation of
the lawsuit to disposition.175 Although this study is older, the average time
from filing of an antitrust case to trial has only increased, from over 18
months in 1996, to over 24 months in 2007.176 Additionally, private litigants
will be unlikely to want to bring an antitrust suit given the low likelihood of
prevailing. One percent of all private federal antitrust cases reach a jury trial
and most cases are either disposed of procedurally through motions for
summary judgment or dismissal or through settlements.177 The possibility of
receiving compensation is distant due to the lengthy time frames of antitrust
litigation, and, given the low rate of success, it is unlikely.

170. SINGER, supra note 156, at 5.
171. Id.
172. See Khan, supra note 147, at 963–4 (“[T]he current “consumer welfare” approach [holds]
that output maximization is the proper goal of antitrust.”).
173. SINGER, supra note 156, at 7 (citing Maureen K. Olhausen, Antitrust Over Net Neutrality:
Why We Should Take Competition in Broadband Seriously, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 119, 136 (2012)).
174. Id. at 6.
175. Daniel A Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 691–
2 (2010).
176. Id. at 692.
177. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONTROLLING COSTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis
trative/antitrust_law/2013_agenda_cost_efficiency_kolasky.pdf.
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Moreover, because of the extended timeline of antitrust cases, there may
not be adequate remedies under antitrust law to cure the loss of innovation
at the edge caused by the anticompetitive conduct. As Singer concludes,
“offering foreclosed content providers, at least some of which are startups, a
venue that could take multiple years and millions of dollars in litigation
expenses is tantamount to offering no relief at all.”178

D. Vertical Mergers as an Example of Antitrust Law’s
Permissive View of Vertical Conduct
Vertical mergers, one subsect of vertical agreement in which vertical
restraints and other exclusionary behavior may arise, provide a
demonstrative window into the permissive view antitrust discourse generally
takes toward vertical arrangements. It is rare that agency challenges to
vertical mergers reach completion.179 Moreover, the long outdated 1984
Vertical Merger Guidelines emphasize the harms of reduced market entry
prospects and the facilitation of collusion, while neglecting the impacts of
“foreclosure” and receiving little attention from the courts.180 Even
supposing antitrust agency enforcement occurs, courts may still be reluctant
to find that such vertical arrangements are illegal. A recent example of this
is the AT&T-Time Warner merger.
1. The Merger Between AT&T and Time Warner
In November of 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought
a civil action to prevent AT&T from acquiring Time Warner because the
effect “may be to substantially lessen competition” in violation of Section 7
of the Clayton Act.181 The Government alleged that the newly combined firm
would likely “use its control of Time Warner’s popular programming as a
weapon to harm competition.”182 In June of 2018, Judge Richard Leon of the
U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia approved the vertical merger
between AT&T and Time Warner.183 The approved deal combines one of the

178. SINGER, supra note 156, at 6.
179. See Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger
Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 91 WASH.
L. REV. 199, 201 n.5 (2016).
180. Id. at 201 n.6 (citing 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 FR 26823-03).
181. See generally United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d. 161 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub
nom. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
182. Complaint at 2, United States v. AT & T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d. 161 (D.D.C. 2018).
183. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d. at 161.
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world’s largest telecom carriers with one of the world’s largest media
organizations. It was approved barely six months after the repeal of the 2015
Order’s conduct rules.
The DOJ made several arguments in opposition of the merger. First, the
DOJ argued that the merger would enable the merged firm to charge AT&T’s
rival video distributors higher prices for popular Time Warner content.184
This would lead video distributors to either pass on this higher price to
consumers by raising their own prices, or to no longer provide Time Warner
content at all, which would result in loss of customers to the rival
distributor.185 Judge Leon dismissed this argument, stating that the
government did not meet its burden of proof in demonstrating that the
merged firm would be able to charge higher prices for Time Warner
content.186 The DOJ’s second argument was that the merger would
substantially lessen competition by creating an increased risk that the merged
firm would act either unilaterally or in coordination with Comcast-NBCU to
foreclose other multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) from
entering the market.187 In response to this argument, Judge Leon noted that
“the benefits associated with AT&T customers accessing virtual MVPD
content continue to accrue even when they use DirecTV Now’s competitors
like Sling and YouTube TV.”188 Video content, no matter the source, would
be using data on the AT&T network that the ISP could charge consumers
for. In other words, AT&T would lack the incentive to foreclose competing
video content because all video content would equally add to a consumer’s
data usage. Finally, the government argued that the merged firm could harm
competition between content distributors by preventing AT&T’s rival
distributors from using the offer of Time Warner’s HBO programming as a
promotional tool to attract and retain customers.189 The Judge found that the
DOJ failed to show that there were no adequate or equally-priced substitutes
for HBO content.
While critics have called the DOJ’s arguments weak,190 they do still get
to the heart of the issues facing vertical merger enforcement in the realm of
net neutrality: exclusion.

184. Id. at 164.
185. Id. at 194.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 244.
189. Id. at 194.
190. See Nilay Patel, The Court’s Decision to Let AT&T and Time Warner Merge is
Ridiculously Bad, THE VERGE (June 15, 2018) https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/15/17468612/
att-time-warner-acquisition-court-decision.
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The AT&T-Time Warner Merger case provides a real-life example of
the flaws persistent in the Chicago School’s justifications for lax treatment
of vertical mergers. The merger presents a serious foreclosure concern,
namely that the merged firm will raise the prices of Time Warner content, or
withhold that content, from other video distributors.
One additional argument the DOJ did not make is that the merged firm
could easy engage in paid prioritization arrangements with other content
providers, by engaging the content providers, either voluntarily, or through
coercion, to commit to paying fees to exclude other content providers.191 This
type of exclusionary conduct by a merged firm is especially salient in the
wake of the FCC’s repeal of the net neutrality rules. Without the 2015
Order’s non-discrimination provisions, there is no ban on prioritization and
throttling of rival content. An ISP is thus not only able, but is incentivized,
to throttle back streaming and downloading speeds of all rival, non-affiliated
content, and raise the prices of access to their distribution network.
Ultimately, however, given the presumption of legality imbued on vertical
mergers,192 courts are still going to be reluctant to find vertical mergers
illegal. The ability for ISPs to merge with content providers magnifies the
incentive for ISPs to engage in restraining rivals by imposing costs or
otherwise reducing rivals’ access to consumers. The repeal of the 2015
Order’s conduct rules allows for ISPs to engage in this anticompetitive
behavior.
While such an argument based on the repeal of the 2015 Order may have
been a missed opportunity in the AT&T-Time Warner merger challenge,193
it can be posed in future merger challenges involving ISPs and content
providers.
2. Conduct Remedies are Ineffective
What if Judge Leon had indeed found the AT&T-Time Warner merger
to be anticompetitive? Would the remedies imposed by the court effectively
prevent the harms to innovation at the edge that the net neutrality rules
sought to prevent? Such a question involves a closer look into typical
methods of redress.
When the DOJ or FTC determines that a merger is anticompetitive, it
must usually choose between two options: seek to block the merger in court,
or negotiate a remedy that will allow merging parties to continue the

191. Id.
192. See supra Part III.A.
193. Patel, supra note 190.
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transaction, if they agree to conditions that are intended to protect
competition.194 When cases involve allegations of exclusive dealing, a rule
of reason analysis is required. Rather than trying to meet the burden of
establishing a “full causal mechanism” under the rule of reason, it has been
easier for agencies to settle with merging firms, imposing remedies while
allowing the merger to go through.195 “Merger remedies take two basic
forms: one addresses the structure of the market, the other the conduct of the
merged firm.”196 “Structural remedies” may be imposed, under which the
combining entities must divest certain of their assets to a new competitor
associated with one of their overlapping business lines.197 Alternatively,
“behavioral remedies,” also known as conduct remedies, “allow parties of a
merger to integrate fully, but then impose operating rules on their business
behavior in order to prevent competition from being undermined or
compromised.”198 Recently, the DOJ has looked more fondly upon
behavioral remedies, specifically endorsing them for vertical mergers.199 The
2011 Remedies Guide states that in vertical cases, conduct remedies “often”
address competitive concerns,200 and that conduct remedies are a “valuable
tool” for preserving efficiencies of a merger while remedying competitive
harm.201
One form of conduct relief suitable for addressing possible
anticompetitive behavior by an ISP merged with a content provider is fair
dealing provisions.202 Fair dealing provisions are those that encompass equal
access, equal efforts, and non-discrimination.203 Nondiscrimination

194. Philip A. Proger & J. Bruce McDonald, Federal Antitrust Enforcers Taking More
Regulatory, but More Flexible, Approach to Merger Remedies, JONES DAY (June 2010),
https://www.jonesday.com/federal_antitrust_enforcers/.
195. JOHN KWOKA, REVIVING MERGER CONTROL: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR REFORMING
POLICY AND PRACTICE 44 (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-Control-October-2018.pdf.
196. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES (Oct.
2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf [hereinafter 2004 REMEDIES
GUIDE].
197. Proger & McDonald, supra note 194.
198. John E. Kwoka & Diana L. Moss, Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 57 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 979, 982 (2012).
199. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES (June
2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf, superseding 2004 REMEDIES
GUIDE [hereinafter 2011 REMEDIES GUIDE].
200. 2011 REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 199, at 4.
201. Id. at 6–7.
202. 2004 REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 196, at 22.
203. Id.
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provisions prevent discriminatory conduct between two downstream
producers, and would effectively prohibit paid (or unpaid) prioritization of
content by ISPs.
Nondiscrimination provisions, however, require extensive time and
resources by the agencies to enforce against the merged firm.204 The DOJ’s
favorable view of conduct remedies in the 2011 Remedies Guide fails to
account for the substantial cost posed by conduct remedies.205 Prohibiting or
requiring certain actions to be taken by a firm “does not negate its incentive
to pursue profit or its interest in circumventing the prohibition.”206 Therefore,
behavioral remedies require ongoing oversight, monitoring, and compliance
enforcement by the government, all of which impose substantial costs and
strain on the agencies,207 making it difficult for agencies to keep up with
monitoring efforts. The outcome of the recent Comcast-NBCU merger
demonstrates these difficulties.
a. The Comcast-NBCU Merger
In 2009, Comcast, the largest cable company in the United States, sought
to enter a joint venture with General Electric (GE) to acquire NBC, a network
that controls multiple popular cable networks including Bravo, Syfy and the
USA network.208 Additionally, NBC controlled other programming such as
nightly news and the Olympics, which it aggregated and sold to
distributors.209 The DOJ was concerned that distributors competing with
Comcast would be at a disadvantage after the merger, because the merged
firm would be able to raise fees on all of the NBC-controlled content it sold
to other distributors.210 The DOJ brought an action to enjoin the merger under
the Clayton Act, alleging these anticompetitive effects of the merger, and
additionally alleging that the merged firm could also damage online video
distributors (OVDs) by restricting access to its programming.211 Instead of

204. Id. at 8.
205. Kwoka & Moss, supra note 198, at 983–984 (noting that “although [the costs of
implementing behavioral remedies] were central to the 2004 Remedies Guide approach [of favoring
structural remedies], that discussion is deleted without explanation of the basis for changed
thinking”).
206. Id. at 997.
207. Id.
208. Complaint at 7 ¶ 16, United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147 (D.D.C.
2011).
209. Id. at 5, ¶ 8.
210. United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147 (D.D.C. 2011).
211. Id.
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litigating the case, the government came to an agreement with Comcast via
consent decree, allowing the merger to go through, subject to over 100
conduct conditions imposed by a consent decree with the DOJ and the
FCC.212
There is consensus that the behavioral conditions in this deal failed, as
Comcast has repeatedly been found violating conditions. One condition in
the deal that was violated was a “neighbor-hooding provision” prohibiting
Comcast-NBC from discriminating against rival channels, making sure they
are not made more difficult to access.213 Comcast was cited by the FCC in
2011 for failing to offer Bloomberg news network with the same high
definition offerings that were available with MSNBC and CNBC. Comcast
settled with the FCC for $800,000 in 2012; however, other smaller
companies were facing this same disparate treatment but were not coming
forward with their complaints.214 Generally, Bloomberg, a larger player, was
unable to receive equal treatment from Comcast, so there was a chilling
effect in the market, where other smaller players were not necessarily
bringing their complaints forward.215 The consent decree required that the
merged firm provide OVDs with access to the NBC programming at the
same rates offered to Comcast, with fair licensing terms.216 Additionally, the
consent decree required that Comcast, as an ISP, shall not engage in
prioritization of its own content over any other content.217 Comcast has been
caught setting caps on unaffiliated online content several different times, in
different service areas throughout the country.218
Research also supports the inadequacy of such merger remedies,
showing that such provisions do little to remedy the competitive harms posed
by vertical mergers. A study by economist John Kwoka found that mergers
subject to divestiture remedies resulted in price increases of about 5.6
percent.219 This differed very little from the price increases seen in mergers
that were allowed to proceed unquestioned.220 Conduct remedies, as present
in the Comcast-NBCU merger, fared even worse, resulting in an average

212. TAKE CARE BLOG, supra note 126.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Modified Final Judgment at 9–10, United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145
(D.D.C. 2011), https://www.justice.gov/file/492176/download.
217. Id.
218. Comcast: A History of Broken Promises, CONSUMER REPORTS (Mar. 1, 2014),
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/comcast-a-history-of-broken-promises/.
219. KWOKA, supra note 195, at 47.
220. Id.
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price increase of above 13 percent.221 FTC research shows that structural
remedies successfully restored lost competition in only a minority of
cases.222 While conduct remedies have increasingly become the remedy of
choice for vertical mergers, studies have shown that both structural and
behavioral remedies are “at best only partially effective in constraining firms
that have been allowed to merge.223
To the extent conduct remedies are used, they take the form of consent
decrees, and we have seen that such decrees don’t work to address the
anticompetitive harms of a vertical merger. The internet industry is most
vulnerable to exclusionary conduct through vertical arrangements. In a
where vertical arrangements are viewed permissively, it becomes even more
likely that exclusionary conduct will occur. If such conduct is challenged, it
will often be subject to ineffective conduct remedies that are demonstrably
easy for internet service providers to violate.

Conclusion
ISPs’ possession of gatekeeper power in the internet marketplace
incentivizes them to adopt anticompetitive practices favoring the content of
their affiliate content providers and profiting through establishment of fast
and slow lanes. In 2008, the FCC filed its first major action against an ISP
for slowing down internet traffic (also known as “throttling”).224 In 2012,
Verizon was caught blocking application downloads.225 That same year,
AT&T was found to have blocked Facebook access to its customers with
Apple devices.226 These were the types of harms the 2015 Order addressed.
The net neutrality rules of the 2015 Order provided an administrative
approach to ensuring the efficient ordering of relationships between
distribution and media. It provided bright-line conduct rules under Title II

221. Id.
222. See FTC, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/study-commissions-divestiture-proc
ess/divestiture_0.pdf.
223. See Kwoka & Moss, supra note 198, at 98.
224. See In the Matter of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13028,
13034, ¶ 13 (2008).
225. Consent Decree, In the Matter of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 20 F.C.C.
Rcd. 8936, ¶¶ 2,4 (2012), https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=In+the+
Matter+of+Cellco+Partnership+d/b/a+Verizon+Wireless,+20+F.C.C.+Rcd+8936&ie=UTF-8&o
e=UTF-8.
226. David Kravets, Net Neutrality Groups Challenge AT&T FaceTime Blocking, WIRED
(Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/09/factime-fcc-flap/.
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authority, giving ISPs clear guidance as to what they were permitted to do.
However, despite scant evidence that harm was unlikely, the FCC went
forward with deregulating internet service providers, putting all trust in the
FTC and the antitrust laws to combat anticompetitive behavior by ISPs.
This note has argued that the “lighter touch framework” of the 2018
Order provides an illusion of control, while exposing the internet
marketplace to the risk of anticompetitive harms that were effectively dealt
with in the 2015 Order. Repealing the conduct rules in favor of case-by-case
antitrust enforcement ultimately puts the burden on the consumer and the
edge provider to enforce ISP wrongdoing, an outcome the net neutrality rules
sought to prevent.

